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Abstract
Change is easy to decide upon and to plan, but hard to implement. This paper deals
with the paradox that despite the most favourable conditions, such as consensus and
abundant resources, the outcome of all the efforts is still so very doubtful. This
narrative of a change project in a big organisation will show how various attempts to
de-institutionalise organisational processes simply succeed in reinforcing existing
institutions. An analysis that combines psychodynamic and institutional theory will be
used for a deeper understanding of the counter-productive influence of anxiety in
relation to the actors’ overt intentions, and how the outcome of support for change can
cause a regression to familiar patterns in the ongoing processes, instead of generating
new paths.
Keywords: Organisational behaviour, organisational change, psychodynamic theory,
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3Introduction
“The new divisional manager is on a well-prepared tour to various departments and
workshops all over Sweden. Loaded with colourful slides he is introducing a new
programme for change. One slide illustrates a sophisticated project organisation,
showing project management, reference groups and all kinds of project teams with
external consultants, internal experts, and project leaders. Another displays the main
programme objectives and the basic principles for the process as a whole. The idea is
that the implementation of change should build on broad representation and
participation on the part of line management, so that results will stick  and
competence will be promoted throughout the organisation.
The present line managers, called champions, have signed all the projects and
accepted responsibility for carrying them through. The project organisation is
presented as a source of support for the line managers, acting only at their request.
The champion of the most important project, the manager of the biggest depot, is very
enthusiastic. He is regarded as a thoroughly competent manager with the right
attitude to change. One year later he is suddenly -  and, for most informed observers,
surprisingly - moved to another position outside the shop and replaced there by
project management – which is now managing the change project as well as  the daily
activities of the shop. The support troops have taken over the business: what has
happened and why?”
This brief exposition describes certain episodes in the course of a change process,
while also providing some background for the present paper. The material has been
taken from a longitudinal study in a state-controlled public utility organisation on its
way towards entering a deregulated market in competition with private business. The
project design offered abundant opportunities for gathering detailed and “thick”
empirical data over the three years of the study.
Earlier research shows that change is easy to decide upon and to plan, but hard to put
through as planned, and that the success of planned change is historically constructed
4(Brunsson; 1990). This should not be taken to mean that everything always remain the
same. Changes occur continuously in the daily life of organisations. New customers,
new managers, new products, new technology all appear, business goes up and down,
and so on. Everything leads to change, but generally with no connection to any grand
plans.
Research also tells us that the best way to effect change is to integrate the process
from the bottom up (Beer, 1990; Bennis et al, 1970; Argyris, 1985). Yet what we see
is very often the opposite: programmes are initiated and implemented from the top
down.
This paper addresses the question of support in change processes, and more
specifically of the investment in external resources to support line managers in
conducting planned changes originally initiated by top-management. What processes
are triggered by this kind of support, and how do they develop?
With the help of the relevant theory I seek to understand and explain the process
briefly described above, up to when the depot manager was transferred.
A paradox lies at the heart of the story, namely that failure ensued even though
everyone involved was striving for success and despite all the resources poured into
the support system.
Lots of energy goes into change programmes like this one in organisational life today,
often under some popular battle-cry like TQM, BSC or BPR, and quite often with
similar results.
Methodological approach and theoretical frame of
reference
5The study is based on field material consisting of taped interviews, participant
observation at formal meetings in management groups at three levels, written
documents and information and impressions gathered from simply talking and
walking around the organisation over a long period (from September 1996 to January
1999). The selection of the data underpinning the  following account and the story
itself have been checked and confirmed by the depot manager concerned.
No research resources would ever be capable of capturing all the processes going on
in the everyday constructing of a big organisation or in a change programme like this
one. But given an ontological approach whereby “macro” is seen as a network of
“micro” and as being constructed in the same way (Latour, 1998), we don’t have to
try to grasp “the whole”, as there isn’t one. There is an endless number of parts, and
by studying some of these parts we can also learn something about the rest, as they
follow similar patterns. Czarniawska & Joerges (1996) offer a similar definition of the
concepts of global/local: the global is not something “above”, it is no more than a
network of local actors and processes.
By describing and analysing various series of events and the interactions between
some of the actors, I will try to shed some light on the dynamics in relations between
different levels of managers, and on the way external support is conceived and
processed.
The analysis adopts a constructionist perspective, whereby organisation is approached
as an endless number of ongoing processes (Berger & Luckman, 1967). These
processes of organisation are more or less institutionalised; they follow very fixed
patterns and are unconsciously taken-for-granted as facts (Douglas, 1986). The
introduction of new change programmes is sometimes an institution in itself, one in
which stability is the ultimate aim of change (Czarniawska, 1996).
The analysis also draws on neo-institutional theory, interpreting change programmes
and the use of consultants as symbols for acquiring legitimacy and for constructing
efficiency in management in the eyes of important others. Conflicts can arise between
6different rationalities for ideals and action, and a gap is then created by decoupling
these from each other (Reason & Rowan, 1981).
Constructionism and institutional theory both presuppose the need for identity,
legitimacy, routines and stability, but don’t tell us much about why the needs exist, or
about the dynamics of the processes for satisfying them. With the help of
psychodynamic theory on existential anxiety and the striving for a steady state
(Bennis et al, 1970) we reach a deeper understanding about this  dynamic and the
possibility of tracing the roots of activities that appear to be counterproductive in
relation to the actors’ overt intentions (Bion, 1961/1974; Boalt-Boethius, 1996;
Roberts, 1994). The concept of organisational anxiety is used in a metaphorical sense,
like the concept of identity applied to organisations (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996).
According to psychodynamic theory the driving forces behind individual action
consist of more or less unconscious motives originating in the need for survival,
endorsement and love, and for coping with the anxiety engendered by conflict
between different needs and different messages from the internal and external world.
Freud identified and categorised the most important means of anxiety-reduction at the
individual level, and labelled them ”defence mechanisms” (Freud, S., 1961; Freud, A.,
1976).
To cope with anxiety individuals develop fairly stable patterns in their modes of
feeling, thinking and behaving. These patterns are related to self-image and identity,
as well as to internalised norms and values. Some of the patterns we call neurotic or
psychotic. The point here is not to talk about how neuroses or psychoses are
constructed and institutionalised in our society, but simply  to link psychodynamic
theory to an organisational context.
Given that micro and macro processes are structured the same way (Latour, 1998), it
is possible to discuss defence mechanisms in groups and/or organisations using the
same concepts as those applied to individuals (Argyris, 1990; Kets de Vries,
1984;1991). An organisation - the macro - is a network of individuals - the micro.
7To get a clearer understanding of the dynamics of the interaction processes, it is
important to look at what generates anxiety and what action (or lack of action) is
taken by individuals, groups and organisations in order to reduce it.
Bion identified three categories of defensive mechanisms in groups, deriving from
different self-images, unconscious basic assumptions about who ”we” are (Bion,
1961/1974; 1967/1993). The categories are labelled the dependency group; the
fight/flight group and the pairing group.
Briefly, according to the basic assumption of dependency, the group acts as though it
were totally dependent on higher forces and consequently often paints the leader in
black or white, looking for the perfect “one”, the omnipotent parent figure who takes
care of everything. A basic assumption of danger and threat to the group is behind the
fight/flight mechanisms and makes the group more action-orientated: ”There’s a war
on and we have to fight or flee”, ”let’s do something, anything” to stave off anxiety,
e.g. reorganise or start a project. The pairing mechanism means that the group relies
on the basic assumption of hope, to what’s going to be born: ”We can’t do anything
now but then, with the new system, the next manager, the new strategy…”.
In Bion’s model a group shifts to defensive behaviour whenever anxiety arises and
threatens the steady state that is the particular group equilibrium (Bennis et al, 1970).
The group regresses from being a working-group, to what he calls an as-if group,
acting as if it were working on the common objectives while what is really going on is
the reduction of anxiety. A group is of course working all the time, but it shifts back
and forth from working on its overt aim or purpose towards actions for diverting
anxiety.
Psychodynamic theory states that the greater the anxiety, the deeper the regression to
earlier stages of development. Regression to old well-founded types of behaviour
corresponds with the process of turning back to old institutions, or sedimented habits,
at the level of the unconscious and taken-for-granted (Tolbert, 1996).
8The organisation you will meet in this paper is in the process of shifting between
different defensive patterns, but what seems to emerge from the analysis as the
predominant basic assumption is “danger” and consequently the fight/flight
mechanism.
The narrative mode of knowing and telling
Scientific knowledge is often contrasted with narrative knowledge, although in fact
logical, rational science presupposes the narrative. There must be a story about the
scientific truth to give it legitimacy (Czarniawska, 1997). However, the difference
between scientific and narrative knowledge is dissolving today, since we no longer
believe in the narratives about eternal truth (Rorty, 1997).
To understand social phenomena is to give meaning to sequences of events, and where
logical/rational science tries to establish the ultimate connections between these, the
narrative leaves things open to negotiation. Interpreting reality is a reflective process
whereby we choose what to attend to and where we have to negotiate its significance
(Weick, 1979; Weick, 1995). This applies to the reference groups as much as to the
researchers.
The narrative mode of knowing opens up new opportunities for telling. From literary
theory we get new categories such as genre, plot and form of presentation, to use in
the narrative of the organisation.
In this paper the genre is that of an action series in which certain chosen events are
presented as separate episodes. Each episode is followed by some reflections on
what’s going on and why. The main plot concerns life in a big organisation in an
environment enacted as threatening and unfair. Lots of enemies are lurking out there,
but we all know that the organisation will survive – big and strong as it is. But this
doesn’t hold for individual units or managers. The climate is masculine and tough;
quick action and rapid changes make life risky in there. The criticism is non-stop and
9comes from all directions - about high costs, bad service or low efficiency. You need
to be smart to snatch a chair when the music stops.
The reader is recommended to adopt the same mode for reading as for watching episodes
in an action series on TV. There may be a history, but you don’t know how or when it
started. Nor do you know the end of the story; there’ll be a new episode next week. The
scene shifts and the action is fragmented. Unless you’re a devotee of the series you won’t
recognise all the faces that appear. Maybe you missed some remarks or a sequence in the
action. Don’t worry. Like watching TV, you don’t need all that much information to
understand the structure of the ongoing processes.
 “Trails on Rails” –  An Action Series
The cast:
The Railway Company
 Ray
 The General
Cargo Division(C) Maintenance Division  (M)
Ray M
PassengerDivision  (P)
Project T 2000
Consultants, internal experts
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     - Line managers
- Union leaders
- Personnel
Summary of earlier episodes
For 1996 the Railway Company has reported surprisingly heavy losses to its highly
dissatisfied owner, the state. Times are bad in the country, with high unemployment
and low demand for services and products. But the General sees this as no excuse.
When sales drop, so should costs. For eight years he has been trying to teach his
people to “think business”. All units now operate as profit centres, billing each other
for services and material on an internal market. This has intensified the fight between
the M-Division and its main customers – the C and P divisions - about what is fair
payment for maintenance work.
At the end of the year the depots in M-Division were forced by the General to pay
back some invoiced money to the C and P divisions.
M-Division  comments:
”They [P and C] are more interesting to the owners and the General prefers to tidy up
their results. By moving money around like this he can decide where to show profit
and where to show a loss.”
M-Depots(MD)
Rob M D (episode 1)
Bill  M D (episode 2-4)
M-Material(MM)
H-Depot
Brian H
S-Depot G-Depot A-Depot C-Depot
”The Pilot 1 Project”
Consultants, internal experts
M-Technics (MT)
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The P and C divisions comment:
” M-division hasn’t cut its coat according to its present cloth. This makes maintenance
too expensive, but it’s not our problem and we shouldn’t have to pay for that.”
In the autumn of 1996 another surprise occurred in M-Division. The present
divisional manager was retiring and everybody expected the present M-Depot
manager, Rob M D, to step up and replace him. Instead someone was recruited from
outside. How was this to be interpreted? There were rumours that the new manager,
Ray M, was an old friend of the head of P-Division. Was the non-promotion of Rob a
sign of a battle lost against the P and C divisions? This fear was confirmed when M-
Division also had to pay them back the money, and left the M-depot managers feeling
anxious and depressed. How were they to cope with this situation?
Episode 1 - Visitors from outside – friends or foes?
In February 1997, after roughly six months of what was felt to be total silence, the
new manager for the M-division, Ray M, makes his first move. He has contracted an
international consultancy firm to make a total analysis of all operations in the
division.
The scene is a meeting of the M-Depots management group, where the situation is
being discussed:
”Someone said one of them [the consultants] had promised that the productivity in the
H-depot could be easily doubled.”
”If that happens I promise to leave my chair at once. I mean, we’d all have to. “
Rob, the M-Depots manager:
” Personally, I think we know better than any consultants what has to be done.”
”We’ll be helpful and give them all the information they want. I’ve also told Ray how
important it is that the information they use is shown to us, and that we are told where
it comes from.”
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”We’ll go on with our own cost-saving project as planned. But we’ve got to define
things clearly, so the consultants don’t produce our suggestions as their own. As far as
I know, they’re paid in relation to the costs they can save.”
Brian H, the manager of H-Depot:
”Maybe the consultants can be of help to us, showing the General how things really
are and proving that the costs are reasonable. Maybe it’s a good thing that someone is
coming in from outside and looking at it all with fresh eyes.”
The meeting goes on, mainly discussing how to interpret the latest financial reports
for the different depots.
Time passes and at the beginning of June the consultants present their analysis. All
the employees (about 1,600) are invited to Stockholm to watch the first ”Brown Paper
Show”. The walls are hung with brown paper describing the various operational
processes. Not very many show up. It’s mostly managers who come. The holiday
period is starting, people are coming and going during the summer.
Interaction between the M-Division management and the consultants is intensive
during this period. A new vision is being created; strategic cost-saving goals are set
for different areas of change, and managers are asked to sign them. Signing means
accepting them and assuming responsibility for implementing them.
Rob questions the strategic goals set for the depots, and refuses to sign. Upon his
return from his holiday it is suggested that he takes another job in one of the
subsidiaries of the Railway Company, working mostly abroad. He accepts
immediately and leaves.
Reflections on Episode 1
The interpretation of the environment as hostile and unfair is an institution in this
organisation (Brunsson, 1990). However, the “marketization” of internal processes
has moved the enemy lines closer, (Edström & Tullberg, 1998), and friends and
enemies can change quickly. People are now also disappointed with the former
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divisional manager for not being able to influence the decision about his successor
and for agreeing to pay money back, and also with Rob for not being approved by the
General and for losing the battle with Ray.
This aroused anxiety among the managers in the M - Depots about what to do and
who to trust. Their former leaders were gone and couldn’t protect them any more. The
basic assumption of the group was now the one of dependency.
The defence in this situation was to seek allies, to remain passive and to follow orders
in a state of waiting and watching the battle between Ray and Rob. When this was
over, everyone joined Ray without protest, and a new leader was born. His power at
this stage was greater than that of the former divisional manager, and the institution of
managerial authority and executive power was reinforced.
By contracting consultants Ray acquired his legitimisation as a modern and active
manager (Abrahamsson, 1996) and as a promising warlord.  He didn’t overrule the
institutions. In this organisation the use of consultants is an example of what in the
literature is called semi-institutionalisation (Tolbert, 1996). This stage includes
objectification of behaviour and some vague theory about how things should be done,
and about categories of problems and solutions. “New fresh eyes are good for
changes.” There must be some interest in continuing the process of
institutionalisation, and we can identify this among both managers and consultants.
Every second or third year consultants have been here.
The situation is still uncertain and many fear the future, but at least people recognise
what is going on, they know where the power is and now action can start. There is a
shift from the basic assumption of dependency to the one of fight/flight.
Episode 2  - Wind in the sails?
This episode opens with Ray travelling round Sweden in September 1997, presenting
the new change project known as T 2000. Lots of words and many slides about a
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threatening environment and a difficult future, about new actors in the market and
tougher demands from the owners. T 2000 is the salvation project, it is to further the
goal of being the leading supplier of maintenance.
Ray singles out H-Depot to become a “model depot” with the help of a project group,
called Pilot 1.
The organisation of the change programme and the resources allotted to it are
impressive. There are several intermediate projects, and every one has a champion
from line management who has endorsed the goals and assumed responsibility for a
specified item of cost-reduction. Every project is to be conducted by a project
management and a project group consisting of consultants and internal experts, with a
reference group to support them. According to the plans sent out, there are altogether
about 20 consultants and 50-100 employees involved full time (but there’s no
information about the costs).
The Pilot 1 Project is presented as one of the most important projects. By reorganising
the operational processes and developing the planning systems, it should be possible
to increase (double?) the productivity and efficiency of the depots.
The scene moves to H-Depot and to the management group meeting there the
following week.  Spirits are high, there’s lots of laughing and joking.
Brian H, the manager:
”I told you from the beginning, when I heard about the consultants coming in, that this
is our chance. We had a choice, to oppose or go along with the new ideas. I’m sure
this is the right thing.”
Brian goes on to describe the Pilot 1 with its various parts and subgroups, as well as
his meetings with Ray, with the T 2000 project management and with the consultants:
”The assignment isn’t actually described in Pilot 1, so I wrote bits of it to be approved
by Ray. When I talked to them [the project management and the consultants] they
were not altogether happy, as they think we’re moving too fast. But it is our project.”
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The group discusses where to place the project group with the consultants - in the
same building as the management, or in another building that has several conference
rooms and where the current meeting is being held. One of the shop managers says:
”They should be separate from the ordinary activities of the depot. They could sit here
instead of up there, though it may be more flashy there.”
Everybody in the group knows that one of the most difficult and crucial decisions for
T 2000 is about closing down some depots - which ones should it be? Brian is tackled
about this: when and how is the decision going to be made? He recapitulates the
decision process to date, and explains that Ray has called for consensus among the
depot managers.
”We’re working on different scenarios, and we’ll be locked in a room until we can
agree.”[Brian H)
The group seems satisfied. To be chosen for Pilot 1 must be a guarantee of survival.
Brian expresses his concern about how all the different groups can be kept together,
and how to develop a mood of co-operation vis-à-vis the union. His suggestion is to
dissolve this management group and to replace it by a steering committee consisting
of himself, the personnel manager and three union leaders.
The mood in the group changes; people are confused and irritated. Questions about
decision making and information are raised. No line managers on the steering
committee? No production supervisor? How and when should ongoing activities and
outcomes be reported? To the steering committee or to Brian?
Brian gives rather vague answers to all this and also hints at a new organisation and a
new mix of people in the management group. People begin to realise that the survival
of the depot by no means ensures their own security as managers there.
Reflections on Episode 2
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A possible interpretation is to regard T 2000 as a flight into a flurry of activities, with
Ray as the perfect flight-leader (Bion, 1961/1974; 1967/1993; Roberts, 1994). The
total absence of any talk about money for resources, or what was already in the pipe-
line as regards the cost-savings planned by Roy M D before he left, tend to confirm
such an explanation.
Brian was felt to have played his cards well, getting Pilot 1 assigned to his depot.
From Episode 1 we know that he left all doors open by having a more positive attitude
to the consultants. He also chose to be more offensive, and was rewarded for that by
Ray. Brian’s position in H-Depot was strengthened, but at the cost of greater distance
between him and his line managers.
At first the managers were active, bursting with energy and power, brushing Pilot 1
aside, literally, into another building. But anxiety arose when the steering committee
was born, and they lost the initiative. Could they trust Brian? Who was Pilot 1
working for? It was not clear where the power was lodged, so they chose to remain
passive and watchful, following orders, in the basic assumption of dependency.
The overt idea was that the consultants should provide support to the line managers.
This should of course immediately evoke some questions about the consultants. For
instance which consultants to bring in; what competence they possessed; what sort of
support or for how many days and to which costs.  But nobody asked for any of these
things. An outspoken and self-confident group fell into passivity, asking only how
they should report and get decisions, but raising no questions about the decisions
made by management (i.e. about the choice of consultants or the dissolution of the
present group). This can be interpreted as evidence that institutionalised processes
relating to managerial power were being reinforced.
Formally, Ray was not taking part in the Pilot 1 activities, but was using consultants
and project groups instead. This corresponds to what Reason & Rowan (1981)
describe as the decoupling of formal structure and ideals from action by ways of
delegation. Thus a gap arose between the ideals originally proclaimed of an open
climate, of line management running the project and of consensus on decisions on the
one hand, and the actions actually undertaken on the other.
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Brian was now isolated both from Ray and from his own line managers. He was also
trapped when it came to using consultants: if he said “no”, he ran the risk of being
blamed for not using them; and if he said “yes”, he might lose control over the
project. In other words, this was a risky position in a fight/flight group, where people
are constantly looking for enemies, internal or external.
Episode 3 - The rise and fall of the steering committee
It  is autumn 1997. The management group at H-Depot has now been dissolved as a
formal meeting-ground for information, decisions and discussion about current and
future activities. The steering committee for Pilot 1 consisting of Brian, the personnel
manager and three union leaders has replaced it.
A Pilot 1 project group consisting of five or six  consultants has been installed in
premises lying apart from the everyday activities in the depot.
The steering committee holds its first formal meeting in October 1997.  The union
leaders pursue a wait-and-see policy, asking about resources for the project and
guarantees for the future. Various managers from the former management group come
and go, reporting on intermediate projects like documentation routines  and a
reduction in stock levels.
The most prominent guest at this meeting is Mr P from the P-Division management.
He receives a warm welcome and expresses his pleasure in being invited. Talking
about the future structure of the depots, he says he’s convinced that H-Depot is the
most important. The meeting continues, rich in mutual reassurances. The war between
the M and P divisions is now over.
Mr P leaves with the words:
”I’ll give priority to this. You are my biggest cost.”
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The union leaders look very satisfied. So does Brian. To get support from P-Division
is the best guarantee of increasing volumes in the depot.
Nonetheless, some problems do come up at this meeting. The new computer system,
the main tool for increasing the productivity by way of better production planning, has
been delayed. The group blames the Computer Division and their interference in the
decision process. Another cloud is an argument between Brian and the consultants
about which shop (there are three different shops in this depot) to start the Pilot 1 in.
The personnel manager:
”But Ray M said it was up to us to decide, and I thought that CG [the consultant] had
changed his mind. I even complimented him for it.”
Brian:
”So did I, but obviously I was wrong. But we won’t give in, it’s our decision”
November 1997 and another meeting of the committee. The mood in the group is
more irritated now. Lots of paperwork and lots of meetings everywhere, but is
anything changing?
The whole organisation is waiting for the new General. The present incumbent is
retiring and the recruitment process has been long-drawn-out. It seems as if no
decisions can be made until the new General arrives.
Brian:
”For us here at H-Depot and in Pilot 1 it’s OK, but in other projects people are being
feeble. There must be a decision about the structure. You can’t motivate people if they
don’t know whether their job will be there next month.”
H-Depot has a bad image in the rest of the organisation. It is said to be less efficient
than the others, and its union to be most militant. Now Brian and one of the union
leaders are arguing about differences in some of the local agreements for the various
depots.
Brian:
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”I really don’t want any slander about H-Depot just now. With Pilot 1 going on, we must be
able to show we can handle this.”
Union leader:
“If we are threatened with the Pilot Project all the time, we‘ll stop supporting it.”
Brian:
 ”OK, I’ll drop the whole question.”
The personnel manager assumes the role of mediator and changes the subject to
something ”softer”, like the importance of proper information and giving people the
chance to talk about their worries.
Pilot 1 is a separate issue at the end of the agenda, and consists of a report from Brian
from the latest T 2000 steering committee:
”Now we’re using white plastic instead of brown paper. It should last for the whole
project… There is a decision about the new computer system now, but it hasn’t been
bought yet. They have to check with X to see if we’re allowed to change suppliers.”
“The decision about the structure is dormant, the new General wants 100 days. But
we’ve got to get ready to take in bigger volumes. More volumes are going to come.
We can move them before any clear decision is made. I‘m a bit worried about this.
How do matters stand in the shops? Say the winter’s hard, and all those people tied up
in the project…”
The union leaders suggest new meetings in the local collaboration groups to find suitable
solutions to the problem of extra volumes. Everyone agrees on the importance of coping
with these and of stopping all the badmouthing in or outside H-Depot.
Brian again:
”I’ll go crazy with all this English talk. It was fun at first but now it feels
ridiculous…The Finance Manager wanted to set some economic goals for H-Depot. I
told him to use figures adjusted to us, and not to let the consultants decide.”
The group moves to another building to visit the Pilot 1 Project group. There are lots
of new computers; walls covered with flowcharts and diagrams; goal-
settings…Mostly young people around.
The principal consultant is an Englishman, celebrating his 30th birthday today.
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Some of the young people at the computers start talking about the work and one of
them says:
 “I am feeding in information so we can control the materials and tasks.”
The personnel manager, acidly:
 “Do you mean we have no planning today?”
Next scene is the scheduled steering committee meeting in December (1997). People
are coming in and it’s soon obvious that this is not in fact the steering committee at
all. More of them are from the former management group. No union leaders are
present. Faces are serious and dogged.
Brian begins by saying that certain things have happened. Union leader A has left his
post “for personal reasons”.
The group ponders on the consequences of this - are there any hidden motives on the
union side and who will come instead? They all agree that the union’s in a mess now,
and perhaps they could take advantage of the situation.
Brian:
“I have thought of re-establishing the management group, but I don’t know who will
be there yet. We’re working on a new organisation, but the consultants and I don’t
agree.”
He draws an organisation chart on the whiteboard so that everyone in the room can
picture their own positions. The argument with the consultants is about the
hierarchical level of the new production-planning function.
He asks the others to consider what solution to choose, and postpones the question to
the next meeting. The group’s mood is now joky and lively.
Brian:
 “Any more questions?”
Line manager A:
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“Yes, I‘d like to talk about Pilot 1. Some people are jumping off, and more will follow
them. They don’t feel anything is happening. It’s just shadow boxing. It’s no good
when the people in a project change all the time.”
Line manager B:
 “I agree. We’ve invested too much to let it go on like this.”
Line manager A:
“The Pilot’s just become a sort of planning-system group floating around, without
anybody knowing what they’re doing. A classy English consultancy group, but of no
help to us. We should be the Pilots, our people should be involved and should stand
up for what’s going on. Producing masses of paper shouldn't be the main activity,
should it?”
Brian is listening carefully, without any protest. The meeting ends and dates are
checked for future meetings.
No one brings up the future existence of the steering committee. The idea of changing
relations with the union is quietly buried.
Reflections on Episode 3
The steering committee provides an example of formal co-optation (Selznick, 1949),
whereby management tried to change the role of the union. There were mutual
interests in expanding H-Depot, and at first this seemed to offer a good solution for
both parties. But the sudden death of the steering committee didn’t surprise anybody,
and it was followed by a retreat into the old forms of obligatory information and
negotiation.
Douglas (1986) describes institutions as thought styles that create the mechanisms for
decision making. The steering committee represented an attempt to change relations
between union and management and the institutionalised roles they were both
expected to perform - by themselves and by each other. This didn’t work out, and it
simply created more anxiety and alienation among the line managers and, as it turned
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out later, also in the union. Change through institutionalised thought styles is naturally
less controversial, and in this case Brian would probably have been more successful
using the familiar settings for collaboration with the union more vigorously.
Another example of co-optation, albeit a more informal one, is the presence of Mr. P
at the meeting. At the divisional level people are eager to demonstrate friendship
between the P and M divisions and to bring the institutionalised war to an end. Mr. P
represents a guarantee of the good intentions of P, but is also a source of support for
H-Depot.
At the beginning of this episode we see the steering committee’s honeymoon, or what
Bion would call the idyll, as a mechanism for flight from the anxiety created by the
new and unknown roles. The basic credo of the idyll is, “We have to stick together
and maintain our borders, as the world is a dangerous and unpleasant place”. (The
Computer Division interferes, people badmouth about us, the consultants try to
overrule us, the youngsters in the group don’t know what we’ve done before, and so
on.)
By the end of this episode the institutions have been re-established. You hear things
like “Don’t trust the union, you don’t know what’s behind…” The line managers
move from dependency to fighting and start to act. They assume responsibility for the
project, accusing the consultants of “simply producing paper” and planning new
meetings.
At this moment the consultants and the project group held most of the power and
initiative, contrary to the proclaimed intentions. But the managers didn’t talk about
how to change their relations with them in order to become more co-operative. Instead
they were arming themselves with arguments and complaints, and securing further
meetings of their own.
Episode 4  - A pyrrhic victory
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It is early 1998. The Pilot 1 Project has been running for about six months, but
nobody is expecting any really substantial results yet. There is still 12 months left.
Lots of consultants and experts are working on Pilot 1 in  H-Depot. The new General
has approved the T 2000 project, but the main decision about the depots to be  closed
down has still not been made official.
The scene is now the premises of the Pilot 1 Project, January 1998. The computer
system has arrived and meetings are taking place in all the rooms. The production-
planning group is discussing implementation of the system. The meetings are being
held in English, and someone has produced a dictionary for the Swedish participants.
There are a number of special terms used by the English consultants related to their
working methods. No Swedish dictionary for them, though.
The project leader says Brian has promised to pop in for a while every day
“so we can tell him what we need.”
Brian and his guests, other depot managers from various parts of Sweden, are arriving
in the corridor. It’s the end of the meeting and the consultants start talking to the new
group and showing them the “As - is” and “To - be” papers on the corridor walls.
They are suggesting a new structure with a “fleet-manager”, to solve the problems
between the M and P divisions. Their chart also includes the new planning function
and a new logistic function.
The guests are silent. It is doubtful whether they really understand this rapid English,
and all the different terms. Some of them can be heard muttering in Swedish on the
lines of
“this is like the sixties, big planning departments separate from production”, “we tried
to let the workers do more and more of the planning themselves, but that’s obviously
stopped.”
Brian also makes some remarks in Swedish, indicating that he doesn’t
agree with the consultants about these planning and logistic functions.
“I want them closer to production. But there’s a bit of a cultural clash between
English and Swedish thinking.”
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Nobody asks about the fleet-manager’s role, or where in the hierarchy this function is
supposed to be.
H-Depot is now a popular place. The next day Ray, the divisional manager, comes
along to meet the managers in the depot. Is it the first time since the Pilot 1 Project
started? Every manager is given some time to report on progress in his or her domain,
and they all sound very self-confident and satisfied. Ray’s main question is, briefly
“Will you be able to cope with the bigger volumes?” and his main message,
“Remember everybody’s watching you now, waiting for problems to appear when
new volumes start coming in”.
Brian, after Ray left:
”That went well, didn’t it?”
Some weeks after this visit, in February 1998, the structure decision was made
official. H-Depot will be expanded and G-Depot is to close. It’s a shock for G-Depot.
Its manager leaves, and there is a lively debate in the newspapers.
There is now intensive interaction between the consultants and the M-Division
management. They could all now breathe a sigh of relief. This decision would make
their diagrams of the cost-savings achieved in the T 2000 project look nicer.
The union is fighting hard, calling on all their allies.
In H-Depot there is no surprise. The new management group is finally established in
March 1998, but now as a “project” for a certain time. This solution is justified on the
grounds that it avoids any time-consuming formal recruitment process.
So far the consultants have won all the battles about the new management
organisation in H-Depot. Some conflict in the consultant group between a Swedish
and an English member led to the departure of the Swede. He agreed with Brian’s
opinion about the organisation and confronted the principal English consultant with
his views.  Now a Swedish-speaking Scandinavian consultant has replaced him.
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This new and more neutral consultant is attending a two-day kick-off with the new H-
Depot management. Other consultants and experts, as well as the new depots manager
– Bill M D, recruited internally, and so far keeping a low profile - come and go during
this meeting. There are mixed feelings in the group. The attitude of the “old”
managers towards the visitors is quite hostile and suspicious.
The atmosphere changes after open discussion about the bad feeling of not being
trusted by the higher levels (as the jobs were “project-based” and not permanent),
about being completely ignored by the consultants and, for some, also about not being
sure of their own future.
“Maybe my job will disappear in the next round?” [Line manager]
This meeting is being held in Swedish. The consultants attending it adopt a humble
and listening attitude.
At the end, Brian exhorts the consultants to stay close to this management group, to
give them full information and let them take part in all decisions.
In June 1998 it is time for the Great Manager Meeting with all the managers in the M-
Division. Brian has been given the honour of facilitating this meeting, and he fulfils
his role with humour and self-confidence. His own report about the Pilot 1 Project
consists of a stack of colourful slides about “what is to be” more than “what is”.
Outside the conference rooms people are gossiping. The production manager for H-
Depot is leaving for another job in September. Why? Doesn’t he believe in Pilot 1?
Don’t Brian and Ray trust him? What about the new computer system? Why isn’t it
working? Will it really be such a powerful tool for cost saving? Isn’t the main
problem that customers don’t provide enough information or follow the plans?
Summer comes, bringing more problems. Several accidents abroad force the Railway
Company to conduct an extra check-up on the vehicles. Work is piling up in H-Depot
and P-Division is complaining loudly about maintenance. G-Depot is still open but
working at reduced speed.
The scene moves to a management meeting in H-Depot in September 1998:
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Present are all the line managers, the project manager for T 2000 and the
Scandinavian consultant. The situation is best described by the following quotations:
“Now it’s Berlin 1945”
 “We mustn’t panic at P-Division’s violent attacks.”
“If we lose the on-time-deliveries, we lose one of our most important weapons.”
The personnel manager reports heavy criticism and anger against the consultants from
her meetings with sixty team leaders on the shop floor. “They are bullies, they don’t
listen, waste of money, they only speak English” etc.
The meeting is noisy and the mood ripe for expressing anger in all sorts of directions.
But it also works vigorously and efficiently at tackling the acute problems.
Brian:
“When is the deadline for us? When do we have to come clean? Do we have three
months to prove we’ll manage?”
At the end of the meeting Brian asks about the feelings in the group and says:
“We’re in a mess at the moment, but I’m still not losing any sleep. I’m positive we’ll
manage this.”
Two weeks later at the next Great Manager Meeting, Ray announces that
“the management of H-Depot has to be strengthened and the whole depot is now put
on a “project basis” managed by the Pilot 1 Project Group. Brian H is going to take on
other work. So is the personnel manager.”
Neither of these two are present at this meeting and nobody asks for them or questions
the decision. They are present only in an information sheet from the union that is
discreetly circulated. In this paper the remaining union leaders at H-Depot make a
furious attack on Ray, Bill and the decision to move Brian.
Reflections on Episode 4
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We can assume that the tension in the project group and among the consultants was
no less than among the managers, but the way of diverting anxiety was different. The
basic assumption was that of the pairing group, (Bion, 1961/1974; 1967/1993)
whereby  hope is focused on what is to come, in this case the new computer system.
It’s hardly surprising that this is a common thought style, (Douglas, 1986) among
consultants, involved as they are in creating and implementing new concepts, systems
and structures.
In this episode we also see that when the formal structure fits closely to the activities,
the need for decoupling disappears (Reason & Rowan, 1981). Ray  turns up in the
depot to make sure that everything is going to work out when the decision close down
G-Depot becomes official. But his visit increases the external pressure, and
consequently the anxiety. The line management group closes ranks against him, puts
up a fine façade and says nothing about the problems.
At the beginning of this episode we can see Brian emerging from his isolation. He is
now closer to his line managers, his colleagues from other depots come to see him and
he is Ray’s favourite (facilitating the big meeting). Two important things have
happened to relieve both H-Depot and Pilot 1 of their anxiety: the decision about
structure has now been made formal, and the new computer system is there to be
implemented.
For a while features of the working-group mode appear, such as openly expressing all
kinds of feelings (including the fear of losing one’s job) and learning from
experiences (Bion, 1961/1974; 1967/1993). Influence is being brought to bear on the
consultants, challenging the suggested organisation, speaking Swedish at meetings,
and getting them to behave in a more humble and listening way.
It is a period of truce in H-Depot, but the cold war is continuing all around them. The
central union follows its own institutionalised lines in fighting Ray on the structure
decision, and P-Division is complaining loudly to the General about M-Division not
managing the maintenance as a result of the same decision. Mr. P left a long time ago.
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Anxiety is rising in the organisation. The basic assumption on the divisional level is
the one offight/flight. Ray has to fight but without any weapons he can use externally,
so he turns the fight inwards, which also represents a flight from the ongoing war with
P-Division. The consultants were his mercenary soldiers, working for money but
contracted for “domestic” use only.  There was also the General’s proclamation about
keeping the peace between the M and P divisions. An internal enemy was the only
solution and in this situation Brian became the natural scapegoat.
By this move Ray first reconstructs his ability to take action and his legitimacy as a
competent manager. As in many other organisations, a powerful old institution for
constructing managerial competence is to move other managers (Brunsson, 1990).
Secondly, by moving Brian, Ray finds a way of legitimating the investment in
consultants. No blame on them any more.
Thirdly, moving Brian confirms that the decision to close down G-Depot was the right
one, as it indicated that the cause of the problem lay somewhere else. This, rather than
their concern for Brian, is probably why the union fights back so hard. Also, to protest
against managerial power is the institutionalised role of the union, and this time their
protest is extremely loud and can be heard all the way up to the General. They also
give voice to all the managers, who are now more silent than ever, in the basic
assumption of dependency, after this demonstration of how easy one can lose one’s
position.
Discussion and conclusions
So, what do we learn from this story? Every day is a drama and this story is no more
dramatic than any others. It has simply been slightly dramatised and is maybe closer
to action than we are used to. Processes much like this probably go on in most
programmes for planned change. My intention is not to judge this change programme
as either a success or a failure. Time will show which interpretation of reality will win
in negotiating how to write the history of the Pilot 1 Project and T 2000 (Brunsson,
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1990; Weick, 1995). Over time history may also be rewritten. Some will call the
consultants a “deadweight”, others will say they had a “turbo” effect. When the
process reached Episode 4 Ray would probably vote for ”turbo” and most line
managers in the depots for ”deadweight”.
More interesting is the paradox described in the introduction to this paper, namely that
although so many good intentions and so many resources (consultants, experts,
managers, the union) were devoted to making  H-Depot into a ”model depot”, things
still developed in such a way that Brian had to leave. H-Depot was defined once again
as a big problem, with - according to general opinion - the wrong attitudes among its
workers and an impossible union. And now there was also the wrong management,
albeit not for the first time: the H-Depot management has been changed about every
second year.
This definition of the problem presupposed the subsequent solutions: change of
management, a tougher attitude towards the union, and the closure of one shop in the
depot forcing the workers to move. There were alternative definitions at hand, such as
useless consultants, bad planning on the part of P-Division, new computer system not
being implemented, bad luck about the extra check-up in the summer, and so on.
The old thought styles are reinforced: ”The H-Depot has always been a problem”, and
”The union there has always been a disaster”. Nothing is de-institutionalised in the
construction of the organisation, not in the divisional management for P or M, nor in
H-Depot itself.
The new divisional manager was not part of the organisations’ history, nor were the
consultants. And it is interesting to note how rapidly and easily they adjusted to the
prevalent thought styles. The institutions are strong and a few newcomers are hardly
likely to change them.
On the organisational level reality is interpreted according to well-known patterns,
and the sense-making process produces self-fulfilling prophecies about the future
development (Weick, 1995). The way of acquiring power is an institutionalised
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process. In this organisation there are two main routes to power: through position or
relations. Other sources of power such as knowledge or experience seem less
important. Managerial power is a strong institution – so long as managers keep their
positions and don’t overrule the institutions. Lower-level management seldom openly
questions the decisions of the managers above them: that’s the role of the union.
This organisation is embedded in a political system ruled by governmental decisions.
We can ask ourselves whether this influences its processes, as alliances and
connections with powerful groups do seem to be very important.
Ray’s power was not questioned, and the consultants’ relations with him made them
his powerful representatives and thus they got managerial power. Ways of responding
to managerial power are also institutionalised in a process that involves following
formal rules, putting on the best front, concealing negative information and trying to
solve problems without asking for help.
These conditions did not create the most open and trustful relations between H-Depot
and its support troops.
From this story I would like to draw some more general conclusions about planned
change and different efforts from top management to de-institutionalise
organisational processes:
• Growing anxiety in a group or an organisation creates a need to defend oneself
and to divert anxiety down to the steady state. This evokes regression to old, deep
institutions for defence and the unconscious adoption of well-known and familiar
behavioural patterns and thought styles.
 
•  In a change programme imposed from the top there are numerous factors that
cause anxiety, such as loss of control, fear of future positions, loss of knowledge
about the location of power, external pressure and conflict about the means for
achieving the goals. Extra resources, internal or external consultants, brought in
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and paid by top management, are likely to be perceived as just more pressure and
as bringing management too close, and thus to become another source of anxiety.
 
•  Attempts to de-institutionalise behavioural patterns (like switching from war to
peace) will raise anxiety, while at the same time reducing the access to familiar
defensive mechanisms (in this case, fighting). Here we have the paradox that the
more one tries to change, the harder it becomes.
 
• It is possible to bring about changes in formal structures, in figures and systems,
by threatening or by demonstrating energy and exerting pressure, but hardly to
make changes in the structure of the ongoing processes, in the institutionalised
behaviour and thought styles - that is to say, in the constructing of the
organisation.
 
• De-institutionalisation of the construction processes is more likely to occur when
the need for the old institutionalised processes is at its lowest level. That is when
anxiety doesn’t exceed the steady-state level for the organisation concerned, and
thus there is no need for defence.
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